Dermot Whittaker

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Defining Morality Appropriately: An Interview with Barney Frank

Originally published in The Long Term View, 3.4 (fall 2006). Massachusetts School of Law

[Dermot Whittaker, interviewer, 4/12/96, Newton, MA]

Long Term View: In your experience, do moral values-—individually held or collectively supported-—affect legislation?

Congressman Frank: Very much so. In the first place, moral values are a major reason why people are either Democrats or Republicans. They vote for somewhat differing moral views—maybe differing views about how to accomplish moral issues. With regard to abortion, people have strong feelings, either one way or the other, that are very relevant. On race questions moral values are very relevant. With regard to the death penalty, some people feel very strongly. People’s sense of compassion for others overseas affects immigration and refugee legislation. People’s moral outrage over those who were violent toward others affects crime legislation, and those are very strongly and deeply held moral feelings. Moral values affect poverty legislation and welfare. There are conflicting moral views there. Some people think that this is a terrible thing, that we give money to people that don’t work hard for it, and that we’re therefore depriving others of their hard-earned work. Some would think that we are penalizing innocent children.

Can you think of legislation where the moral component is minimal?

The best example of an important bill where that’s the case would be the telecommunications bill, although a lot of people felt strongly about the censorship part. I had strong moral objections to the censorship; other people had strong moral reasons why they wanted censorship. But the interrelationship of the long-distance companies and the former regional Bell operating companies—that’s a purely technical, economic discussion. Bank securities issues—Should banks be allowed to sell securities or not? Should banks be in the insurance business or not?—no real moral feelings there.

How would you define moral values?

One of the best definitions is Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s. He called them his “can’t helps.” He said those are the things he can’t help feeling. They don’t have a logical basis; they are the platforms from which you then reason logically. They are the basic value-premises—beyond logic—which you have about how human relations ought to be ordered, how people ought to treat each other.

Is that a problem when people seem to have values that are conflicting or that they may view as conflicting?

Right. I think abortion is an example.

Would you view things like patriotism, respect for hard work, and abhorrence of violent crime as strictly moral issues, or do those reflect values which perhaps are civic virtues

Civic virtues are also moral ones. Abhorrence of violent crime is certainly a moral thing—I already cited that. Patriotism is a mix. It’s easier for America because we’ve had a good society for much of the time. Patriotism becomes the hardest thing if you happen to live in a pretty unpleasant place.

There are two elements of patriotism for Americans. To the extent that there is a belief that America has been one of the strongest advocates of effective democracy—now that’s moral. To the extent that there is a kind of emotional attachment to the place of your birth, that’s nonmoral. It’s not immoral; it’s just a more emotional sense.

Do constituents in your district voice concerns over issues related to moral values?

All the time. Many of the people in, for instance, Newton, Brookline, Wellesley—areas in the northern part of my district—especially voice concern about human rights overseas. They are particularly upset at the notion that the United States would be supporting regimes that violate human rights, or about the plight of refugees of various kinds. People throughout the district express very strong moral views on abortion, one way or the other. People express strong moral views on both sides of the question of equal treatment for gay men and lesbians. And on the environment—environmentalists in particular are strongly motivated by a moral sense that the earth and its physical accoutrements are a heritage that we have and that we are morally obligated to protect.

Is that a view that you share for the most part?

Less than some other environmentalists. My environmentalism is less tinged with this kind of religiosity; it’s more of a pragmatic thing.

Historically speaking, have some moral values been especially important to the political or the social well-being of the United States?

Certainly democracy, which is a moral value. Remember, democracy, when we first practiced it as a country, was the reflection of a very moral, minority view. The Declaration of Independence is a very firm statement of morality. “We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights”—that’s a very strong, powerful, articulation of a moral sentiment. On the other hand, America was plagued by the absence of morality with regard to the treatment of blacks. Allowing slavery in the Constitution and perpetuating it for so long, and then, after a brief flirtation with equality for black people right after the Civil War, having a national policy of segregation—that’s our greatest moral failing. There’s a case where the absence of morality damaged this country, because I think the biggest single problem we have on a continuing basis is the effects of these years of racism.

What are some sources of morality in American life? Where do people’s moral values seem to come from, in your view?

I think, essentially, they come internally. Obviously religion is one source. Education is a source. Families are a source. But I’ve seen so many people of similar backgrounds come out with different values that I am compelled logically to conclude there is some internal process that is the most important differentiating factor.

Do you perceive anything like a moral crisis in the United States today compared with twenty or thirty years ago?

No, I think people exaggerate that. I think in many ways we’ve gotten more moral. For instance, with regard to racism, sexism, homophobia, we are much better than we were. Homophobia is a great example of where we’ve made enormous strides. Sexism is another example. If I were talking to a young woman of 18 or 20 today, I would point to great gains compared to when women graduated from college thirty years ago. Thirty years ago there was still a great deal of sexism. We have made strides also in regard to race—there was a ten-year period from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies where we made some real gains. Recognition of our responsibility to people who are physically handicapped—that has been a major area of gain. Crime has become worse in some ways, but I think what we’ve had is a kind of disparity. I think most people are living by a better moral code. Unfortunately there is a minority of us who are increasingly violent, who are, of course, quite immoral. And that’s a real dilemma as to how we deal with that. I think society as a whole has higher moral standards today than it did, in terms of fairness, in terms of equality, in terms of the standards of our politics. American politics today is much less corrupt than it has ever been.

Conservatives argue that the whole commitment to government, to a just society, to liberty itself, is a profoundly moral or even religious commitment and that attempts to reconstruct government in rationalistic terms, cut off from some sort of religious, or at least profoundly moral, philosophical view is hopeless or even corrupting. Is that a view that liberals can share at all?

Well, first of all, I think you are describing a conservatism that is not basically an American conservatism. In Burkean terms, Americans that we talk about as conservatives are quite liberal. I mean, they’re rationalistic. Remember, in the European sense, almost all Americans are liberals—with the exception of Pat Buchanan, who’s nuts. As a matter of fact, conservatives in America, many of them, very much take the rationalist approach. Indeed, we will be voting on five or six amendments to the United States Constitution proposed by conservatives today on rational or pragmatic grounds.

To answer your question in general, for Americans: I do not believe that there has to be a religious basis. I don’t think there is any necessary religious basis to morality. There is a religious basis for some morality, but I think it is perfectly possible for people to be quite moral without it being anchored to any particular religion; it is also unfortunately the case that people can profess to be quite religious and not be very moral at all. How do I respond to the notion that the commitment to government is profoundly moral? Well, I gave as an example our commitment to democracy and the Declaration of Independence. I think those reflect some of the most fundamental moral questions because to me morality has to do with how you treat each other. . .

In your opinion, does the moral appeal of health care legislation work for the Democrats? Is there in fact a moral appeal to such legislation?

Yes, I think there is. It got outweighed, in 1993 and 1994, by an argument that it was a self-defeating effort, not that it was an immoral effort. I don’t think people rejected the legitimacy of trying; they were persuaded that it would do more harm than good. But I think it has a powerful appeal to America when you say, “There are going to be people who will be sick and won’t be cared for.” I don’t think Americans want that to happen at all. I think that’s why the Medicaid and Medicare cutback arguments have backfired to some extent on the Republicans.

When are moral considerations relevant in the area of foreign policy?

I think they always are. My criticism of foreign policy professionals—Henry Kissinger exemplifies it, but it has been true of a lot of Democrats—is that they undervalue moral considerations in foreign policy. The goal of policy is essentially a moral one. And I think here is a case where means become ends. Just having nice relations with people is not an end, it’s a means—a means to a better life for all of us.

I think we were right in the big moral question of foreign policy for the last sixty years: we as a society and our allies, the democratic nations, were morally superior, first to Adolf Hitler and his allies, and then to the communists. There’s no question that England, France, and America were morally superior, as societies, to the Soviet Union, China, and Rumania. Unfortunately, in the service of that greater morality, we sometimes thought we could sacrifice lesser morality by supporting repressive people as long as they said they were with us in the big fight, and that was a mistake. Now the problem is economics. We get seduced away from morality by being able to make some money. Front page of yesterday’s New York Times: The Chinese, to show that they’re not going to listen to our criticisms of their human rights policy, just bought some Airbuses instead of buying Boeings.1 I think that at present it is economic pressures that are eroding human rights concerns.

Can you think of some specific areas of moral disagreement in foreign policy?

China is one of the major ones. The Chinese governmental system really is quite deficient by any rational moral standard. The notion that we have to be nice to them because we need their help in foreign policy and because we can make money selling things to them, that’s very powerful. The biggest moral failing we have today is our failure to articulate our moral disapproval of China.

How about the issue of foreign aid to Africa and Asia?

Oh, I think we’re making a great mistake. The second biggest failing is how little we are doing for Africa. It’s the continent with the greatest problems, poverty and disease, and these are problems that are directly related to the way the West behaved. Maybe they would have different problems if they had never been colonized—I wouldn’t be the one to deny it. America’s walking away, cutting back what we do for Africa, is a serious moral failing. We’re letting children suffer when, with a little effort, we could do a lot to alleviate that. We couldn’t solve it all, but we could do a lot more, with no great strain on ourselves.

Is foreign aid an area for moral leadership in the country, to make Americans aware of its importance?

Yes, I agree. That is one of the things that people should be focused on.

You mention the new international economy and its insecurities. Is that an area of politics with a moral dimension?

Absolutely. I think that’s an occasion for the Democratic vision of government. The Republican vision—as Dick Armey, the majority leader, articulates it—is: Markets are smart and government is dumb. I think you should add, however: Markets are morally blind and government is morally sensitive. A case for government is in part that the markets, especially now in a time of transition, globalization, technological change, are sometimes very unfair. If we have the moral values that people who are willing to work hard should be allowed to make a living, that diligence and responsibility should be honored, that families should not suffer, and so on, then the government has to intervene sometimes.

Some candidates are talking about using the presidency as a bully pulpit to preach against pornography, or to discourage, at the very least, entertainment which they believe denigrates family life. Such an activist role is necessary, they argue, to protect the interests of society as a whole. On what basis can liberals confront those cultural issues?

I think it is as much a liberal issue as not. If you look at the damaging stuff that’s on television, violence is a big part of it. I thought the great hypocrisy of Bob Dole was to talk about these terrible violent movies and never mention a Schwarzenegger movie or a Stallone movie. Where you talk about violence, I think it’s perfectly reasonable for politicians to preach. I do not have any high hopes for it. As a matter of fact, I think people greatly exaggerate the extent to which the media influences people. That is, I do not think that the average child who watches violent television becomes violent because of it, any more today than years ago, when I was a kid, and some people would say, “Oh, you shouldn’t play with guns, you shouldn’t watch these movies.” I don’t think they had any effect on me; I don’t think they had any effect on most kids.

The problem is still social and economic disorganization—that’s what makes kids violent, not watching movies. Most of the kids who watch most of the violent stuff are never violent. It’s the social and economic factors, the lack of parental supervision, and so on. Kids are influenced by what they see around them in real life, not movies. People are much more influenced by the people they deal with. I have no objection to preaching against violence; I just have no high hopes for it. As far as pornography is concerned, where you’re talking about what adults watch, I think that the decision by adults to watch other adults who are nude and doing things to which they have mutually consented isn’t any of the government’s business. I’m very worried about censorship now. We have started down what I think is a very threatening path. Today, if you write something or say it, it is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. But if you were then to transmit what you either wrote or said electronically, whether it’s on television or whether it’s through the Internet, it is somehow considered to be less protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. Since an increasing amount of what we say to each other will be electronically transmitted, we are winding up with a First Amendment that is substantially diminished in scope. I think it is a terrible mistake.

Some conservatives argue that the interests of society might outweigh that.

Right. Unfortunately for them, that’s not what the First Amendment of the Constitution says. The First Amendment of the Constitution says, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ” There’s not a clause that says, “unless it is deemed by a majority in Congress at any given time to be in the interests of society.”

I understand that the people who drew up the Constitution made the decision that, on the whole, free speech was more in the interests of society than censoring it. Of course, it is possible to come up with an ideal world in which only the good things are said and only the bad things are censored, but who decides that? I’m especially leery when the people who tell me that they’re enthusiastic about censorship are the ones who think the least of people in public life, as often occurs, because I don’t know who they think is going to do the censoring. It is not going to be some community of clergy or scholars or moral philosophers. If in fact we have censorship, that censorship will be wielded by elected officials. Conservatives say a lot of things, some of which I agree with, some of which I don’t. But the notion that the interests of society are a reason to censor free expression is, I think, one of the worst things people say.

What was your position on the School Prayer Amendment?

I’m against the School Prayer Amendment.

School prayer itself means a lot to certain voters, and one complaint in particular is that, in their opinion, schools restrict free speech or free exercise of religion by disallowing even general prayers or voluntary prayers.

I never heard of schools disallowing prayer.

This is the perception of some voters.

No, but they know that’s not true. They just don’t define it correctly. Anybody that knows anything about kids in schools and about prayer knows that there are infinite opportunities for a child to pray. You can pray when you’re walking in the hall. You can pray when you’re sitting there. If you want to pray aloud, you can pray aloud in various places. This may not happen very often, and I am not arguing that these are common occurrences. My point is that these are things students could do if they wanted to, and the reason they don’t do them is that they are not motivated to, not that they are prevented from doing them by any law or regulation.

I believe this is what some people find objectionable—the fact that students do not pray enough spontaneously—and they want the schools somehow to take on that role. In other words, what they are objecting to is not that children can’t pray, but that no one is encouraging the children to pray.

You mean no one such as the teacher or administrator or a person over the loudspeaker?

Or another child for official purposes. However, one child could encourage another to pray, saying, for example: “Do you want to say a prayer?” or “Could we say grace before lunch?” There have been some instances where school officials incorrectly disciplined children for praying or reading the Bible—those schools were wrong. Whenever a child has the right to read something on his or her own, or to speak, if they want it to be religious, that’s fine. There was a school where they disciplined a kid for reading the Bible on the school bus. That school was wrong. That’s a First Amendment right that kid has. I was cosponsor of the bill, the Equal Access bill, which said that religious groups have as much right to meet in schools, after school, as any other group.

Could religious groups meet as a club or something like that? The same sort of status?

Yes. There was this case where the kids were being told that they could have the environmental club, the Young Republicans, the Young Democrats, the young anything, but they couldn’t have the Baptist Fellowship. We passed a law to say that the school couldn’t do that. I supported that law. I think a lot of liberals were wrong not to. As it turned out, I think we were right and they were wrong. That law has worked out quite well.

If a child comes to school and has been taught at home that prayer is a good thing, that kid can pray. Nobody should try to stop him, and in most cases, nobody will try to stop him. What the conservatives here are saying is, “Well, you know, the parents won’t give the children enough religious inculcation. The parents will send the kids to school, and the kids won’t be sufficiently willing to pray, so therefore we have to use the fact that we’ve got this kid in school to encourage the kid to pray more than he or she wants to.” That’s what I object to. Apparently here—it’s very ironic—but the conservatives say, “We can’t trust the parents. Parents won’t bring up the kids to be religious enough. Therefore, when they get to school, we better encourage them to be more religious.” No, that’s not the school’s job.

I am absolutely for maintaining and protecting the freedom of any child to pray in school if he or she wants to pray in school—aloud and on a whole variety of other occasions, whenever it is appropriate. There are times when it is not appropriate for a child to speak out—in class, for instance. But there are an infinite number of times during the day when it’s appropriate for a child to speak, and I believe at that point his or her right to pray should be protected.

Do you support President Clinton’s statements concerning school prayer?

President Clinton is not proposing any changes; he and I are describing the reality. We are telling people that they have been misled by those who say that kids can’t pray in school. It is true, there have been some teachers who have kept a kid from praying in schools. There have been teachers who have kept a kid from wearing a political thing in school. Adults don’t always respect kids’ rights. Justice Scalia told them they don’t have to. He has got language saying children don’t have the same rights as everybody else when they’re in school. I was wholly supportive of President Clinton’s statement because it was an explanation of the existing law, which is that people who want to pray in school have a right to pray in school.

In the discussion of morality and its influence in the political life of the United States, what aspect of the debate do you feel is most neglected?

Namely, the need to truly define morality. Part of the problem is that people talk as if one aspect of morality—sexual behavior—exhausted the range of relevant moral concerns. Sexual behavior is—obviously should be—moral, in the sense of respect and how people treat each other. This to me is morality, how people treat each other. What happens is that some people allow morality to be defined very narrowly and then say, “Oh, morality doesn’t belong in government.”

What we need to do is have morality defined appropriately. Whether or not children are allowed to starve—that’s a moral issue. Whether or not people are given freedom or whether or not they have serious illnesses inflicted on them without the ability to protect themselves—those are moral issues. I think it was a morally appropriate decision for the government to substantially reduce the amount of lead in the air because, as a result, we have many fewer three-year-olds today who are brain-damaged. I can’t think of a more morally appropriate thing for a government to do than protect helpless three-year-olds against the ingestion of lead. I think that this debate has gotten distorted. One group defines morality too narrowly. Typically conservatives define it too narrowly. Liberals accept the excessively narrow definition of morality and then argue that morality is irrelevant. Instead what they should be doing is insisting on a broader definition of morality and then making clear how it is relevant throughout society.

Copyright, Massachusetts School of Law, 1996.